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Abstract 
This article examines how and when populist discourses were mobilised within the 
2016 UK EU Referendum campaign, by examining the specific temporal 
conjunctions between the changing strategy of the official ‘Vote Leave’ campaign, 
British National newspaper reporting of the Referendum and shifts in public opinion. 
Our analysis shows that Vote Leave only started to utilise anti-elitist and 
exclusionary populist rhetoric at the mid-point of the campaign, in response to 
constricting political opportunities, but by so doing transformed the dynamic of the 
Referendum. We term this an example of ‘strategic populist ventriloquism’, where 
elite politicians appropriate the language of insurgency for political advantage and 
argue that current conceptual frameworks on media and populism need to be 
broadened to accommodate these occasions. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
'Brexit', the term used to label the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
European Union, has become characterized as a predictable manifestation of a 
populist wave sweeping across many nations (Norris and Inglehart, 2019, Eatwell 
and Goodwin, 2018). When making such claims, however, there is a need to guard 
against what E.P. Thompson once termed ‘the enormous condescension of posterity’ 
(1963: 12) and lapse into post-facto determinism. From contemporary vantage 
points, it is easy to forget how unexpected the outcome of the UK EU Referendum 
vote was, even among those advocating the UK's withdrawal (e.g. Vine, 2016). 
Brexit may demonstrate a growing potency of populist discourses across the political 
mainstream, but we should remain curious about the specific contexts and 
contingencies of their mobilization.  
In this article we examine how and to what extent political populism was used 
to frame the official ‘Leave’ campaign that preceded the EU Referendum vote. This 
analysis will examine the representation of populist discourses in mainstream 
national newspaper reporting of the Referendum and in turn how this mediation 
intersected with temporal changes in the campaigning strategies of the ‘Leave’ 
campaign. We argue that populist discourses only mobilized as the campaign 
progressed in response to a range of contingent conditions. Further, we contend that 
a time-sensitive analysis of the type we develop here is not only of intrinsic 
significance in understanding the Referendum outcome but also in enhancing 
understanding of mainstream media responses to political populism. To explain this 
 
 
broader relevance, it is necessary first to relate the detail of our analysis to the wider 
literature on populism and the media.  
Defining populism 
For a term so freely invoked there is surprising disagreement as how 
‘populism’ should be defined. In this article, we follow Jagers and Walgrave’s 
definition (2007), who argue that ‘complete’ (or ‘thick’) populism has three constituent 
parts: (1) it makes reverential reference to ‘the people’, (2) it is anti-elitist, and (3) it 
defines ‘the people’ by the rhetorical exclusion of other population categories (e.g. 
immigrants). 
 The first component in this categorisation (characterised by Jagers and 
Walgrave as ‘thin populism’) is ubiquitous and invoked by politicians of all stripes. 
For this reason, we focus on the presence of anti-elitist and exclusionary rhetoric in 
the 2016 EU Referendum, to arrive at a settled estimation of the presence of 
‘complete’/ ‘thick’ populism within the campaign. As noted, our analysis focuses on 
assessing these dimensions in mainstream newspaper discourses and by so doing 
seeks to contribute to an emerging literature on media and populism that explores 
the mutual tensions, communalities and dependencies of that relationship. 
Populism through and by the media 
The relationship between media and populism is gaining increasing attention 
(e.g. Esser et al., 2016; de Vreese et al., 2018), particularly in relation to whether the 
media act as ‘initiators or catalysts’ of populist public attitudes and as allies, even if 
unintentional ones, of populist leaders and parties (Mazzoleni, 2003: 2, see also 
Mazzoleni 2008, Krämer 2014). As Moffitt argues, media can ‘no longer be treated 
 
 
as a ‘side issue’ when it comes to understanding contemporary populism. It must be 
put at the centre of our analysis’ (2016: 94).  
Media populism, according to Krämer, comes with the adoption of populist 
stylistic and ideological elements by media (2014). Mazzoleni argues that there is 
widespread ‘media complicity’ in many cases in the rise of populist leaders, parties 
and movements because media institutions have legitimated certain populist issues, 
keywords and communications styles (2008: 50). This is not to claim that media 
institutions necessarily actively support populist ideas but that the charismatic and 
contentious communication style of populist politicians feeds a commercial media 
logic and thereby provide a favourable environment for populist ideas and projects. 
Indeed, some media are quite capable of denouncing the successes of populist 
parties while unwittingly contributing to public awareness and support for the populist 
worldview through their routine practices (Deacon & Wring, 2016, Krämer, 2016; 
Picard, 2016).  
In formalising these distinctions, scholars have drawn out typologies of media 
relations with populists. Wettstein et al. (2018) suggest three roles that journalists 
can play: a ‘gatekeeper’ role (opening or closing the news gates to populist actors), 
an ‘interpretative’ role (evaluating populists positively or negatively in their coverage 
of them), and an ‘initiator’ role (active engagement in propagating populist ideas). In 
their analysis of print media in ten European countries, they found that, contrary to 
suggestions of media complicity or vulnerability, the ‘news gates’ often remain closed 
to populists, and when they do appear populists tend to receive negative 
assessments. However, journalists can also initiate populism by presenting 
themselves as the ‘voice of the people’ in adopting an ‘anti-establishment bias’ 
(2018: 14).  
 
 
Similarly, Esser et al. (2016), propose a typology consisting of populism by 
the media, populism through the media and populist citizen journalism. Populism by 
the media ‘refers to media organizations actively engaging in their own kind of 
populism’, an exemplar of which, the authors argue, is the British media’s permanent 
and hostile cynicism towards politicians (akin to Wettstein et al’s ‘initiator’ role). 
Populism through the media suggests the notion of a vulnerable media, who serve 
as a conduit for populists’ communication strategies. In this model, there is a 
convergence ‘which is usually unintentional, between the "production logic" of 
commercialized media and of populist political movements’ (Mazzoleni, 2008: 54-
55). In other words, populism through the media comes about largely through the 
high news value of populism, which populists capitalise on and journalists struggle to 
resist (Esser et al., 2016).  
Lifecycle populism 
There is also a need to consider the temporal aspects of the mediation of 
populism. The most influential conceptual framework on temporality developed to 
date is Stewart, et al.’s lifecycle populism model (2003), which identifies four phases 
for populist movements. The ground-laying phase entails the creation of a public 
climate of opinion receptive to populist political responses through the publication of 
stories emphasizing elite corruption and the alleged harms caused by outsider 
groups. This climate helps to give rise to populist movements during the insurgent 
phase leading to the creation of populist political parties who challenge the 
mainstream parties at elections. The formation of populist political parties is often 
enabled by the presence of a charismatic leader skilful at playing both the elite 
media who find themselves in an ethical dilemma about whether and, if so, how to 
report insurgents (as not to report their progress would be anti-democratic while to 
 
 
report their progress may have anti-democratic consequences) and the tabloid 
media who give populist parties considerable attention because of their controversial 
qualities. The established phase concerns the period where the populist party has 
become a durable presence in parliament and even in government. This greater 
institutional importance increases elite media engagement but reduces tabloid media 
interest. This is because once populist parties are forced to engage with the 
complexities and compromises of everyday politics, they lose their ‘power to 
scandalise’ (2003: 223) which in turn initiates a decline phase.  
The existing literature on media and populism in the UK suggests that the 
British experience has tended to see populist parties remain at an inchoate ground-
laying phase, never quite progressing to the latter stages of Stewart et al’s model 
(e.g. Manucci and Weber, 2017). Further, the quality press tended to give more 
coverage of populist parties than the tabloids (Akkerman, 2011, Deacon and Wring, 
2016).  The British print media has, however, also been associated with laying the 
ideational foundations of populist sentiment through the adoption across sections of 
the press of an anti-establishment and anti-migrant agenda (Stanyer et al., 2016). In 
the context of Brexit, it is also important to note many newspaper’s sustained 
contributions to Euroscepticism (Daddow 2012, Startin 2015). But this ground-laying 
did little to open the gates for populist insurgents in media terms prior to the 
Referendum. For example, Deacon and Wring’s (2016) study of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) showed the party broadened its rhetoric to take on elites 
and immigrants to raise public antipathy to the EU, but this had little immediate 
impact in mainstream media terms, with UKIP being virtually ignored by the media in 
an editorial response that Deacon and Wring refer to as ‘passive’ containment (2016: 
176). Later, UKIP managed to gain considerable media attention in the 2014 
 
 
European elections and the 2015 General Election as the party’s ‘electoral 
momentum made it impossible to ignore’ (Deacon & Wring, 2016: 180, see also 
Deacon & Smith, 2020). This coverage was largely negative: marking a move 
towards the ‘active containment’ of UKIP, in which UKIP was routinely derided as 
racist. 
The trajectory of UKIP seems, therefore, to complicate the predictions of the 
lifecycle model. But a full assessment of the value of the model should go beyond its 
applicability to specific political contexts. On the positive side, as well as 
foregrounding temporality in understanding media responses to populism, it focuses 
attention on the importance of supply-side questions in explaining the growth of any 
‘populist zeitgeist’ (Mudde, 2004): i.e. how effective strategic actions by political 
sources, involving media engagement, are needed to exploit any demand-side 
opportunities. Nevertheless, there are limitations to the model in our view. First, as 
noted, empirical exceptions have been found to this ambitious, archetypal model 
(e.g. the assumption that tabloid media are more engaged in driving the insurgent 
phase than elite media). Second, the model solely conceptualises populist political 
actors as emergent ‘outsiders’ who gain power and influence and by so doing 
become ‘insiders’ (however reluctantly). This neglects instances where established 
political sources, whose politics are not ordinarily conveyed via exclusionary or anti-
elite rhetoric, commandeer the populist baton. We term this strategic populist 
ventriloquism and any understanding of the potency of political populism needs to 
appreciate the significance of ‘insiders representing themselves as outsiders’ (Clarke 
and Newman, 2017: 101). Third, this recognition challenges the implicit linearity of 
the lifecycle model, as it shows how politicians and parties can move from 
‘established’ to ‘insurgent’ positions and then return, when conditions and 
 
 
contingencies are more favourable. Finally, the opportunism that drives strategic 
populist ventriloquism by established political figures can occur quickly and to great 
effect. This means any temporal perspective needs to be alert to the significance of 
short-term change, particularly during moments of political crisis, as well as the 
longer-term, phased transitions suggested by the lifecycle model.  
The pertinency of these points are revealed in the details of the political and 
media dynamics of the 2016 EU Referendum. And it is to these matters that the 
discussion now turns 
Research design and methods 
Our research design sought to identify the origins and mediation of populism 
in the campaign by exploring temporal and political links between (a) the political 
strategies of key protagonists in the ‘Leave’ campaign, (b) the parameters of 
mainstream newspaper reporting of the contest, and (c) public opinion trends. The 
analysis of the Leave campaign is based on a qualitative summary of primary and 
secondary evidential sources.  
The analysis of national newspaper coverage is based on twin quantitative 
content analyses. The first analysed the prominence of ‘immigration’ as a theme in 
coverage, which we take as a signal of the likely presence of exclusionary 
discourses within mainstream news reporting. The second concerned the usage of 
anti-elite terms or concepts. Through this twin-track approach we seek to assess to 
what extent ‘thick populism’ was activated through and/or by the newspapers or 
contained. 
We recognise that our sole emphasis on newspapers needs explanation and 
justification, particularly in the new media ecology. Certainly, this emphasis is not 
 
 
intended to deny the significance of other social and legacy media whether generally 
or in the specific communication of the Referendum campaign. Research 
consistently shows TV news remains the most widely trusted and accessed 
mainstream news source in the UK and social media has become a significant player 
in its own right, not least in the rapidity and intensity with which it can channel public 
reactions to political events.  
We focused on the press for four reasons. First, UK national newspapers still 
have significant public reach, despite declining circulations of their published 
iterations, whether through their own online platforms or the circulation of their 
content via social media (Chadwick et al, 2018). Second, the UK press has long 
been recognised as a significant driver of British public and media opinion on 
Europe, particularly in feeding Euroscepticism (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999). In 
these respects, we see national press coverage as a ‘critical case sample’ – i.e. the 
media arena where populist (and anti-populist) sentiments and persuasive intentions 
regarding EU membership would be most clearly and stridently articulated. Third, 
and notwithstanding the previous point, in terms of immigration coverage our wider 
research also showed that its temporal distribution in the press was replicated in 
national TV news coverage. In this respect, therefore, the press analysis can be 
deemed as a ‘typical case sample’ - i.e. telling us something about wider mainstream 
media responses to this part of the Referendum (see Deacon and Wring, 2016: 24-
3). We did not include TV news results in this component of the analysis, as we 
wanted to ensure that our analysis of the presence of exclusionary and anti-elitist 
discourse was based on a like-for-like comparison. Fourth, voting analysis after the 
Referendum showed ‘age’ to be among the most consistent and significant 
predictors of how people voted (e.g. Norris & Inglehart, 2019: 385-391), with the 
 
 
groups most likely to support withdrawal (i.e. older people) being less dependent on 
social media for news and most likely to read the national press. Research also 
demonstrated an association between reading a Eurosceptic newspaper and voting 
Leave (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017: 459). 
The newspapers sampled were the printed weekday editions of all national 
titles between 6 May and 22 June 2016. Five of these newspapers supported Leave 
(Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Sun, Star) and five supported Remain 
(Guardian, Times, Financial Times, Daily Mirror, and i). Data about the prominence 
of immigration as a theme of newspaper coverage is taken from a wider content 
analysis of TV and newspaper coverage during this period (see Deacon and Wring, 
2016). For the press component, we monitored all election related items on the front 
pages, the first two pages of the domestic news section, the first two pages of any 
specialist election campaign section and the page containing and facing 
newspapers’ leader editorials. All news items, comment pieces, feature article and 
leader editorials in these spaces were analysed and this analysis focuses on those 
items where immigration appeared as a prominent theme or subtheme. This 
produced a dataset of 374 newspaper articles published in the last seven weeks of 
the referendum campaign.  
The data set for the analysis of anti-elite rhetoric was generated separately, 
using the Nexis newspaper database. A bespoke keyword query design was 
generated by assessing public speeches and texts delivered by key Leave 
campaigners to identify common terms used to disparage elite actors and institutions 
 
 
in the campaign.1 The resulting keyword search returned 276 news items published 
in the off-line weekday editions of the newspapers. (Note that this search included all  
printed national newspaper content during the sample period, rather than just 
prioritised editorial spaces.) Intercoder reliability tests were conducted on both 
content analyses2. 
Findings: Vote Leave, the media and the public 
We begin our analysis by outlining the strategy that the official anti-EU 
campaign (Vote Leave) implemented during the referendum, and how this shifted. 
We follow this with an analysis of the way this strategy interacted with and was 
mediated by the UK print media, in terms of its coverage of immigration and anti-elite 
rhetoric during the campaign. Finally, we connect the Vote Leave strategy and the 
media coverage of the campaign with public opinion trends during this period. 
The dynamics of the Leave campaign 
When David Cameron unexpectedly gained a majority government in the 
2015 General Election, several anti-EU campaign groups started to form in response 
 
1 This resulted in the following search string: “(EU OR European Union OR Brexit OR 
referendum OR Vote Leave OR Leaver! OR Leave campaign OR Take Back Control 
OR Leave.EU OR Grassroots Out OR Labour Leave OR Remain campaign OR 
Remainer! OR Britain Stronger in Europe OR Labour In for Britain) w/5 (elit! OR 
establishment OR unaccountable OR bureaucra! OR eurocra! OR political class! OR 
lobbyi! OR quangocra! OR superstate OR unelected OR brussels club OR so called 
expert! OR so-called expert!)”. The connector phrase “w/5” requested Nexis to return 
only those news items in which referendum terms came within 5 words of anti-elite 
terms. 
2 For the immigration analysis, average pairwise percent agreement (APPA) was 
used to assess the reliability of seven coders analysis of 8 news items. News items 
themes: APPA 70.4%; Direction of themes: APPA 76.3%. For the anti-elitism 
analysis Krippendorff's Alpha scores for all variables of reliability between two coders 
ranged from 0.82 to 1. 
 
 
to his commitment to hold a public vote on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union. The eight months between the election and the announcement of the 
referendum date were marked by infighting between these groups. This was no 
jostling on a pinhead: at stake were divergent views of the reasons for withdrawal 
and the strategies for securing that outcome.  
Vote Leave (VL) was launched in October 2015 and was designated by the 
Electoral Commission as the official campaign for Leave in April 2016. Its supporters 
included many senior Conservative party figures (including Michael Gove, then 
Justice Secretary), prominent Labour MPs like Gisela Stuart and UKIP’s sole 
Member of Parliament, Douglas Carswell. It also eventually secured the backing of 
Boris Johnson, after weeks of public prevarication. Two figures of fundamental 
significance were Dominic Cummings, previously a special adviser to Michael Gove, 
who became VL Campaign director, and Matthew Elliott, a renowned political 
lobbyist, who was appointed as Director. Both figures played a key role in 
formulating the Vote Leave campaigning strategy. At the outset, VL sought to 
advance an economic case for withdrawal: promoting a ‘positive’ and 
‘internationalist’ vision for Britain (Cohen, 2016) whilst also seeking to ‘neutralise the 
fear that leaving may be bad for jobs and living standards’ (Cummings, 2014).  
Leave.EU (LE) was co-founded and funded by businesspersons Arron Banks 
and Richard Tice and launched in September 2015. It drew directly on the populist 
rhetoric cultivated by UKIP to which it had strong connections. Banks had been a 
long-term donor for UKIP and Nigel Farage, the then UKIP leader, publicly endorsed 
LE. Farage subsequently went on to co-found Grassroots Out (GO) in January 2016, 
purportedly out of frustration at the divisions between VL and LE. Other members of 
GO included the Labour MP, Kate Hoey, Conservative MPs, Liam Fox and Peter 
 
 
Bone, and members of the Democratic Unionist and Respect parties. In reality, the 
differences between Leave.EU and Grassroots Out (LE/GO) were negligible and we 
treat them here as one and the same. LE/GO promoted an insular, nationalist line, 
targeting immigration as a key-battleground and constructing increased migration as 
an economic and security threat to the nation. Their Communications Director later 
conceded that their treatment of this sensitive matter tested the boundaries of 
political acceptability (Briant, 2018).  
Virdee and McGeever (2017) identify two competing racialized narratives in 
the VL and LE/GO campaigns. Both emphasised the reassertion of sovereignty, but 
the VL campaign was rooted in an ‘imperial longing’, in which an unfettered British 
nation could once again bestride the globe. In contrast, the barely codified racial 
attacks of LE/GO campaign advocated a ‘retreat from a “globalizing” world, one that 
is no longer recognizably “British”’ (p. 1802). What is undeveloped in Virdee and 
McGeever’s analysis, however, is that these characterisations represented the 
starting point for both camps during the formal referendum campaign, and neglects 
the significant shift in the ‘discursive architecture’ of Vote Leave from late-May 
onwards, in which it moved decisively towards the terrain set out by LE/GO. 
This was evident in several ways. From the end of May, VL’s discussion of the 
positive economic case for Brexit focused on a single, and subsequently discredited, 
claim that leaving the EU would provide an additional £350m per week to the 
National Health Service. At the same time, VL started to focus on immigration 
concerns in its public pronouncements. This followed a meeting between Boris 
Johnson, Michael Gove and Dominic Cummings, in which the Campaign director 
urged them jettison qualms about party disloyalty and ‘hit [the Prime Minister] and 
[Chancellor of the Exchequer] over the head with a baseball bat with immigration 
 
 
written on it’ (quoted in Parker, 2016). This shift is confirmed by analysis of VL official 
news releases produced during the campaign. Between 6-26 May, only 2 out of 21 
released between 6 and 26 May mentioned immigration in the title or first paragraph, 
whereas 8 of the 15 produced between 27 May and 5 June did so.3 On 29 May, 
Johnson and Gove wrote an open letter to the Prime Minister ridiculing his attempts 
to reduce net migration and accusing him of ‘corroding public trust’. The following 
week VL sought to stoke public concerns about the economic and security 
implications of open borders by issuing a controversial leaflet that emphasised the 
prospect of large-scale migration from Turkey were it to accede to the EU and 
security concerns about its shared borders with Syria and Iraq. Campaigners in the 
LE/GO camp were delighted by this turn: on 1 June Nigel Farage tweeted 
‘Everything I’ve said on immigration, for which I’ve been condemned, is now 
mainstream. I now believe we will win this referendum’ (Farage, 2016).  
Simultaneously, leading VL spokespersons started to articulate anti-elite 
sentiments, the most famous example being Michael Gove’s comment to Sky News 
on 3 July that the British people ‘have had enough of experts’. A few days’ 
previously, Priti Patel, then Conservative employment minister, suggested the 
‘luxury’ lifestyles of those in the Remain camp meant they were ‘insulated’ from the 
impact of immigration.  
It has been claimed that this shift towards exclusionary and anti-elitist rhetoric 
was part of a deliberate long-term strategy of the Vote Leave campaign (see 
Shipman, 2017: 49, 298), but there are grounds for suspecting that they were as 
much a product of necessity. By mid-May, the political opportunity structures seemed 
 
3 We thank Paula Keaveney for supplying some of the Vote Leave press releases 
that this analysis is based on. 
 
 
to direct VL down this avenue. Leave were losing ground in the polls, credible 
business sources and economic experts almost entirely endorsed Remain, and the 
immigration figures released at the end of the month showed net migration levels 
had not reduced in line with Government forecasts. The key question is whether this 
shift to a populist terrain by the officially sanctioned Leave campaign had any 
appreciable effect on media coverage during the remaining weeks of the campaign?  
Immigration coverage 
Figure 1 compares weekly fluctuations in immigration-related coverage for the 
last seven weeks of the Referendum campaign. The bar chart data compares the 
frequency with which pro-Leave and pro-Remain newspapers reported on 
immigration as the campaign unfolded. The line graph data then weights these 
results by circulation. We provide this additional detail since the pro-Leave press had 
far greater circulation than the pro-Remain press during the campaign, even though 
the number of newspapers supporting each campaign was equal.  
The results show that pro-Leave newspapers contained consistently higher 
levels of coverage of immigration in the sections analysed for every sample week. 
The rise of immigration coverage was steady and consistent over weeks 1-6 of the 
sampling, reducing slightly in week 7 as ‘horse race’ coverage increased in 
anticipation of the vote. For Remain-supporting newspapers, the increase was more 
dramatic in weeks 4 and 5, where levels of coverage nearly matched those in pro-
Leave newspapers. Coverage tailed off as the vote neared. 
 
Figure 1: Average Daily Newspaper Coverage of Immigration  
 
 
 
Note: unweighted = average number of items per day; weighted = average numbers of items per 
day*circulation (1=1m). 
   
The timing of the convergence in increased attention to immigration across all 
newspapers between 27 May - 9 June is significant as it maps directly onto the 
moment Vote Leave decisively changed its campaign emphasis. Our analysis also 
shows that Vote Leave’s two main figureheads (Johnson and Gove) accounted for 
more than one-third of all direct quotation by any person or organisation featured in 
immigration coverage over this period.  
When these comparisons are weighted for circulation a clearer sense of 
differences in the mediated visibility of immigration as a Referendum issue emerges. 
In terms of public reach, any reduction of pro-Remain newspaper emphasis in the 
final weeks of the campaign had little compensatory effect when set against the 
sustained and increasing levels of attention in the pro-Leave press.  
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Coverage of immigration alone cannot be assumed to be an indicator of the kind 
of exclusionary discourse that features in ‘thick’ right wing populism. It may be that a 
significant proportion of the coverage is countering such discourses or reporting the 
positive benefits of migration. To assess the evaluative nature of immigration 
coverage, we noted whenever it appeared as a theme, whether the reference was 
portrayed as having positive implications for ‘Leave’, ‘Remain’ or mixed/unclear 
political consequences (see Figure 2).  
The results show that pro-Remain newspapers cumulatively reported mixed 
implications for the protagonists. Pro-Leave newspapers, on the other hand, 
concertedly framed the implications as supporting pro Leave arguments (i.e. the 
negative social and political implications of net migration). Circulation differences 
accentuate these differences.  
Figure 2: Campaign Implications of Immigration Coverage  
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Our analysis now moves to compare the relative prominence of anti-elite 
populism in national press coverage of the campaign. As noted, official Vote Leave 
campaigners started to voice anti-elitist terms and concepts at the same time as their 
campaign weaponised immigration. In this second content analysis, we differentiated 
between occasions where anti-elite terms or ideas were reported (1) factually/ 
dispassionately, (2) supportively/ sympathetically, or (3) critically. Factual usage of 
these terms offers an example of populism through the media, sympathetic use is 
indicative of populism by the media, and critical usage is an example of active 
containment.  
Figure 3: The Presence and Evaluation of Anti-Elite Rhetoric in Referendum 
Newspaper Coverage 
 
Figure 3 charts the trajectory of anti-elite-related press items across the last 
seven weeks of the campaign. The line shows that in cumulative terms their 
presence remained consistent for the first five weeks but increased in the last two 
weeks. The bar chart components reveal major shifts in the presentation and 
articulation of anti-elite as the campaign unfolded. For the first three sample weeks, 
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anti-elite terms and concepts were principally conveyed in a neutral way – i.e. they 
were recorded rather than appropriated or repudiated in their editorial presentation. 
From week 3, the difference between descriptive and supportive usage narrowed 
and by the final days supportive invocations most commonly occurred. In contrast, 
challenges towards anti-elite concepts and terminology occurred infrequently 
throughout, remaining a negligible element even during the latter stages of the 
Referendum.  
 Figure 4 disaggregates these figures according to the stances of the 
newspapers on the Referendum. Critical treatment of anti-elite terms and discourses 
was almost completely absent in pro-Leave newspapers, whereas supportive usage 
dominated. Criticism was evident in the pro-Remain coverage, but neutral invocation 
more frequently occurred. When these distributions are weighted by circulation, the 
overall dominance of supportive references to AE terms and discourses becomes 
even more accentuated.  
Figure 4: Treatment of Anti-Elite Terms and Concepts  
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For each item, we identified the principal source of AE terminology or 
sentiments. In 47 percent of items, they were invoked directly by the journalists 
writing the piece, rather than through the quotation of accessed sources. 
Furthermore, the rise in AE-related coverage towards the end of the campaign was 
driven by a significant increase in journalistic commentary, as the domain of anti-elite 
coverage shifted from news reports to opinion pieces, columns and editorials. In 
weeks 1-3, 53 percent of AE related items were news reports, by weeks 4-5 this 
reduced to 40 percent and in the final two weeks to 31 percent.  
Journalists’ approbation of anti-elite terms in their coverage also varied 
depending on political and market orientation. In the pro-Remain press, which was 
dominated by up-market newspapers, journalistic usage was split relatively evenly 
between critical (34%), supportive (28%) and non-evaluative (38%). In the tabloid-
dominated pro-Leave newspapers, supportive usage accounted for 90% of these 
instances.  
Overall, this analysis of anti-elite populism in the press during the referendum 
campaign reveals that it gained in volume towards the latter stages of the campaign, 
and that Leave-supporting newspapers supplied a substantial increase in supportive 
coverage of anti-elite populism to the Leave campaign in the final fortnight of the 
campaign. Much of this seems to have been initiated by the shifting focus and 
rhetoric of the Vote Leave campaign but was subsequently amplified by the lexical 
choices of journalists themselves. 
Public opinion 
Most eve-of-voting polls mistakenly predicted a Remain victory in the 
Referendum. This failure attracted criticism, but, as the British Polling Council 
 
 
president commented ‘their central message – that this looked like a close 
referendum that neither side could be sure of winning – proved prescient’ (BPC, 
2016). What also tends to be forgotten is the volatility in opinion as the campaign 
developed. Figure 5 collates findings from 140 opinion polls held in the last weeks of 
the campaign (Natcen, 2016) and indicates a major rise in Leave support from 27 
May onwards: the precise moment that the Vote Leave and media agendas shifted. 
Prior to that date, Leave was losing ground to Remain; by mid-June Leave was 
consistently polling ahead of Remain and in line with the eventual vote.  
Figure 5: Pro-Leave Support Minus Pro-Remain Support (Opinion Polls, 6 May 
– 22 June 2016) 
 
We emphasise the need for caution when noting these links. Correlation does 
not prove causality. And even if one sought to make such a claim, where should the 
causal chain be deemed to have started? As shown, the shift in Vote Leave’s 
strategy was driven by their polling inertia, thereby casting it as a dependent rather 
than independent variable (if we were thinking in these terms). What can be claimed 
plausibly from this evidence is that a complex, interactive dynamic gained 
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momentum at a critical moment in the Referendum campaign, and there is a strong 
evidence to suggest this was highly consequential in a situation where fine margins 
mattered. We do not doubt there were multiple participants and factors in creating, 
sustaining and amplifying this dynamic, including the mainstream media – whether 
by reporting prominently the changed priorities and terminology of leading 
campaigners (populism through the media) or enthusiastically appropriating these 
issues and terms in their own editorialising (populism by the media).  There is no 
evidence, however, that any particular section of the national press played a 
significant, independent role in initiating this change. 
 
Concluding discussion  
Brexit is often now characterised as a paradigm case of an inexorable spread 
of populist insurgencies across western political systems. When explaining the 
outcome of the 2016 EU Referendum, analyses of this kind often focus on the wider 
conditions that created a receptive environment for populism: years of trenchant 
Euroscepticism in the media and political classes, anxieties about cultural identity, 
growing economic inequalities, anger about globalization, and the erosion of the 
social contract through austerity (e.g. O’Rourke, 2018). Further, while the first-past-
the-post system of UK politics tends to suppress populist political representation, 
UKIP’s emergent successes in second order elections suggested the existence of a 
groundswell of populist support among the population that was liable to exploitation 
given the simple voting system of the referendum campaign. But we contend these 
factors alone cannot explain the outcome of the Referendum. Any ‘conjunctural 
analysis’ of Brexit (Clarke and Newman, 2017) needs to account for short term 
‘supply side’ opportunism as well as long term ‘demand side’ determinism. Our 
 
 
analysis of the political and media dynamics of the EU Referendum in the UK shows 
that populist discourses in the Referendum campaign did not emerge spontaneously: 
they were mobilised, crafted and amplified by key protagonists over a comparatively 
short time frame.  
The critical moment was the decision taken by the official Vote Leave 
campaign at the end of May 2016 to change their focus and foreground exclusionary 
and anti-elitist discourses, thus emulating the nationalist rhetoric of the 
Leave.EU/Grassroots.Out campaign. This populist gambit led by senior political 
figures within the Conservative party provides an example of what we term ‘strategic 
populist ventriloquism’ and it was later to re-surface in the Conservative party’s 2019 
General Election campaign, when Boris Johnson styled his campaign as a tribune of 
‘the people’ against ‘parliament’.  
This shift in the Vote Leave strategy transformed mainstream media reporting. 
The prioritisation of immigration immediately forced the topic up the national press 
agenda, regardless of newspapers’ political stance on EU membership. Differences 
were evident in the evaluation of this campaign shift, with pro-Remain newspapers 
emphasising its mixed implications for the protagonists and pro-Leave newspapers 
framing their coverage overwhelmingly as favouring the case for leaving the EU. The 
coincidental deployment of populist anti-elite rhetoric by senior VL figures took longer 
to embed in mainstream press reporting, but there was an appreciable increase in 
the last two weeks of the campaign. Here again, differences emerged between pro-
Remain and pro-Leave newspapers: the former relayed the discursive shifts in the 
campaign, the latter embraced and advanced them in their own editorialising. The 
eve of voting represented a critical juncture where the circuit of ‘complete populism’ 
was realised in aggregate media terms, with exclusionary discourses and anti-elitism 
 
 
at their highest levels. This convergent temporal shift in ‘cues from political elites’ 
(Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017: 458) and the mediation of the campaign coincided with 
a striking change in the political momentum of the campaign. One does not have to 
revert to crude causal explanations to suggest that, in a volatile, knife edge, ‘either/ 
or’ political situation - in which every vote counted - this new dynamic had profound 
political significance.  
These findings connect with and qualify existing work on populism and the 
media in several ways. The differences between pro-Remain and pro-Leave 
newspapers respectively offer examples of populism through the media and 
populism by the media. But what is striking is how dependent both these responses 
were upon the actions of the official Leave campaign. It may have been that news 
values of the largely tabloid pro-Leave press made them more receptive to the 
articulation of populist discourses than the mainly ‘up-market’ pro-Remain press but 
they only did so to a concerted extent after VL’s shift in campaign strategy. Before 
that, all the national press had disregarded the same arguments advanced by the 
competing Leave.EU/Grassroots Out campaign. In other words, there was a similar 
collective ‘passive containment’ response, such as has been noted in other studies 
of media and populism: marginalising and ignoring insurgent voices. It was the 
mainstreaming of populism by Vote Leave midway through the campaign that 
licenced the pro-Leave press into more active ‘collaborative’ responses, whereas the 
pro-Remain press veered towards a more ‘active’ containment approach, although it 
had a half-hearted quality in terms of challenging anti-elitist populist discourse.  
This study highlights the need to foreground temporality into understanding 
media responses to populism. In doing so, there is a need to move beyond linear, 
periodic models that describe media and populist orientations as developing and 
 
 
declining in a glacial manner. The 2016 Referendum offers an example of how 
sudden populist ebullitions can change significantly the parameters of media 
populism and with lasting consequences. Any explanation of this, in turn, requires 
closer consideration of the sources of populist rhetoric. ‘Thick’ populism is no longer 
(if it has ever been) the sole preserve of outsiders seeking to move from insurgent to 
established status. The 2016 EU Referendum demonstrates how established 
political actors can move in the opposite direction: appropriating the language of 
insurgency for political advantage. When this strategic populist ventriloquism occurs, 
the political radar of the mainstream news media can become scrambled and, to mix 
metaphors, gates that were generally held closed can be prised open.   
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